This working paper provides a business history perspective on debates about the Great Divergence, the rise of the gap in incomes between the West and the Rest, and the more recent Great Convergence, which has seen a narrowing of that gap. The literature on the timing and causes of the Great Divergence has focussed on macro analysis. This working paper identifies the potential for more engagement at the micro level of business enterprises. While recognizing that the context of institutions, education and culture play a role in explanations of wealth and poverty, the paper calls for a closer engagement with the processes how these factors translated into generating productive firms and entrepreneurs.
Introduction
Over the last decade the Great Divergence, or the timing of when the wealth gap between the Western world and the Rest of the world opened up, has been prominent issue in the discipline of economic history. The debate has been conducted at a macro-economic level, however, and business historians have made hardly any contribution. They have made a potentially richer contribution to the less explored question why the Rest failed to catch up after the gap had opened up, though most of this literature has not been structured in terms of the Great Divergence. This working paper begins with these two debates before turning to the Great Convergence of the last three decades. By 2017 China was the world's second largest economy. It accounted for nearly 15 per cent of world GDP. Asia as a whole Most of the existing explanations for the slowness of catch-up have been at the macro-level, and have only implicitly explained the lack of emergence of modern firms.
These explanations can be crudely summarized as falling into three buckets. The first, and initial, explanatory bucket is the role of culture. The West had the "right" culture, and the rest had "wrong" cultures for capitalist enterprise. Writers from Weber (2011 edit) to Landes (1998) to Mokyr (1990, chapter 9) have made this argument, as has more recently Ferguson when he identified the Protestant work ethic as one of the West's "killer apps." (Ferguson, 2011) However leaving aside the well-known criticisms of such cultural generalizations, these studies have never explained how exactly culture impacts firm formation and quality of business decision-making.
The second big explanation is that, following the work of North, the West had the "right" institutions to promote capitalist economic growth, and the Rest did not. (North 1990 (North , 2005 . This has led to debates about the long-term impact of particular colonial regimes, such North America had the "right" sort of colonialism, while the Rest did not, and about countries with common law having the "right" legal regime for encouraging capitalist development, and the rest not. A big problem is that this literature has largely used property rights laws as a proxy for institutions. (Jones 2013, 14-18) . It is not evident that the West had superior property rights regimes to parts of the Rest. British India has the common law system. The widespread existence of market activities and the importance of private property in nineteenth century (and earlier) China would not suggest an overwhelmingly poor property rights regime. (Faure 2006 , Deng 2000 . While the lack of company law in that country might have made capital-raising hard, when China finally introduced a Company Law Act enabling limited liability in 1904, few Chinese companies registered under the act. (Kirby 1995) Nor is it evident that business enterprises were simply passive recipients of legal regimes. Musacchio has raised serious doubts concerning the adverse impact of civil law regimes on financial and economic development. Brazil was a French civil law country with apparently inadequate creditor protection and contract enforcement, but Musacchio found that Brazilian firms used their own byelaws to offer strong protection for equity investors. (Musacchio, 2008) Finally, education (or lack of it) has been used as an explanatory factor for global wealth and poverty (Easterlin, 1981) . Goldin (2001) has made a strong case for attributing American industrial leadership to the unique egalitarian mass provision of post elementary schooling achieved in the United States during the early twentieth century.
While plausible, the link with the development of modern business has never been clearly established. Worryingly, eighteen and nineteenth century China had widespread literacy, which did not translate into the creation of modern firms. (Deng 2000) Probably the greatest negative consequence of low education levels was raising the cost of skilled labor.
In the case of colonial India, the high cost of skilled labor has been identified as one possible explanation why the country remained inclined to small-scale traditional manufacture. (Roy 2000, chapter 7) Context -whether institutional, cultural, or education -matters for capitalist development, but the existing Great Divergence literature, primarily written by economists, has yet to provide firm evidence how exactly it shaped entrepreneurship and business.
Baumol's work on differences in what he terms the rules of the game between society enables a more explicit connection to be built. Baumol argued that the contribution of entrepreneurship on societies varied because of the allocation between productive activities such as innovation and unproductive activities such as rent seeking or organized crime.
This allocation, Baumol suggested, was in turn influenced by the relative pay offs offered by a society to such activities. (Baumol 1990) Maurer's study of the Mexican financial system from the late nineteenth century shows how this context played out in one country by demonstrating how the existence of an undemocratic political system and selective enforcement of property rights shaped the financial and business system. Limited in its ability to raise taxes to finance infrastructure projects as well as fend off political opponents, the Mexican government of the dictator Porfirio Diaz relied on banks to provide credit, while the banks relied on the government to enforce property rights. A select few bankers were given extensive privileges producing a highly concentrated banking system. Each bank grew fat in its own protected niche. To overcome the problems associated with information asymmetry, banks lent to their own shareholders and other insiders. In the case of the textile industry, banks did not lend to the best firms, but the best-connected firms. Poorly defined property rights prevented those excluded from the insider networks from pledging collateral and finding another financial route. (Maurer 2002) More broadly, institutional and societal context was a major factor explaining why technological catch-up was a huge entrepreneurial challenge for entrepreneurs in nineteenth century India, Mexico and elsewhere in the Rest. The new advanced technologies of the West were embedded in quite different (not better or worse) institutional, economic and social contexts than in the Rest. Entrepreneurs could not simply import them and they would work. Factor endowments fundamentally shaped the commercial viability of different transferred technologies. (Roy 2009 ) Relevant technologies needed to be identified, they need to be adapted, they needed to be financed, and they needed to be used. This was challenging and costly, although not impossible. (Beatty 2003a and 2003b) This explains, in part, why there were such significant regional differences in entrepreneurial performance in many nineteenth century Latin American countries, despite having the same laws, language and culture at the national level. (Cerutti, 1996) Closer examination of the "institutional arrangements" which promoted growth in many countries raise many questions about the "right" and "wrong" institutions which promoted entrepreneurship and firm growth. As Casson has suggested, cultural differences towards information and "trust" levels may have been especially important in explaining variations in the quality of entrepreneurial judgments. (Casson 1991) It is evident that business enterprises in many non-Western societies were often challenged to grow beyond a certain size because their societies found it hard to "trust" non-family members as either managers or equity holders.
Japan was an unusual society where "blood ties" were not decisive in determining trust levels. Arguably, the rapid Japanese move to employing professional managers may have Indeed, as entrepreneurs in the Rest began catching-up with their Western counterparts, they were often successful in developing hybrid organizational forms adapted to their local contexts. In China, the new modern business enterprises which appeared in early twentieth century typically combined the formal organization of Western-style corporations with traditional, well-established business practices from China's preindustrial past. A study of the rapid growth of Shanghai's print machinery industry from the late nineteenth century has shown that in this industry, unlike others such as textiles, Chinese entrepreneurs were so successful that they were able to replace foreign machine imports with products from the local machine industry. (Reed, 2004) The pre-eminence of ethnic and religious minorities in entrepreneurial activity points towards a combination of contextual explanations for the slow growth of modern business enterprise. As many countries in the Rest began to industrialize, minorities or immigrants were especially important in new firm creation. These included Chinese in south-east Asian, Indians in east Africa, Lebanese in West Africa, Italians in Argentina, and French in Mexico. Their success has often ascribed to particular ethical or working practices, but their role is more plausibly explained as a demonstration of the challenges faced by entrepreneurs in societies where trust levels were poor, information flows inadequate, institutions weak and capital scarcity. In such situations, small groups with shared values held major advantages as entrepreneurs. If in addition, they established an intermediary role between locals and Western firms, they could secure easier access to knowledge and information, from and about, Western countries.
The prominent roles of particular ethnic and religious groups in Indian modern industry can be explained in such terms. The role of the tiny Parsee community around Bombay has been variously described as the result of close relations with the colonial authorities, "outsider" minority status, and a "Protestant" style work ethic. (Desai 1968) However the Marwaris were far less close to the British. Indeed, a number of families, like the Bajaj, became active in the Independence struggle. Other explanations for their preeminence have been found in unique cost accounting methods and the work ethos. (Timburg, 1978) Wolcott has combined both cultural and institutional factors to explain the preeminence of Indian minorities. She relates the situation to India's caste system, and argues that the payoffs to entrepreneurship differed across caste lines. Members of the moneylending and trading castes like the Marwaris could enforce contracts through reputation and membership deterred cheating. As a result, they were efficient at providing financial and other resources to entrepreneurs within their own castes. However, the large number of potential entrepreneurs outside these groups lacked privileged access to these informal financial networks, reducing their incentives to engage in productive entrepreneurship. (Wolcott, 2010) The ethnic clustering in modern entrepreneurship in India, and elsewhere, was striking, but as Roy has suggested, another way to look at such clustering was geographically. Before 1914 Bombay and Calcutta accounted for half the modern factories in India, and even more of related services such as banking and insurance. Unlike other cities in India, they had grown through the activities of the East India Company, and were outward-oriented and cosmopolitan. In these two port cities, Roy observes, "modern Indian business enterprise and business families congregated and recreated a globalized world with strong Indian characteristics." (Roy, 2012) The emergence of hubs such as Bombay, and modern entrepreneurship in general, also took place within the context of the wider political economy environment.
Explanations for why ethnic Chinese business became disproportionately important in Southeast Asia typically stress cultural factors, including the role of family, dialect groups and the Confucian value system. With respect to the latter, it has often been argued that social trust, the social obligations that bind family and lineage, was strengthened by the Confucian belief, and that provided the bedrock of commercial networking. Yet while some or all of these features may be significant, the growth of Chinese entrepreneurship in Southeast Asia also has to be placed within a wider political economy context. Yet the establishment and maintenance of mines, oil fields, plantations, shipping depots, and railroad systems involved the transfer of packages of organizational and technological knowledge to host economies. Given the absence of appropriate infrastructure in developing countries, foreign enterprises frequently not only introduced technologies specific to their activities, but also social technologies such as police, postal and education systems. Between the late nineteenth century and 1914 residents of most of the world's cities were provided with access to electricity, in their homes or at work, or else in the form of street lighting. (Hausman et al, 2008) However spillovers and linkages to local entrepreneurs were limited by the nature of global capitalism at the time. Many natural resource investments were enclavist.
Minerals and agricultural commodities were exported with only the minimum of processing. Most value was added to the product in the developed economies. Foreign firms were large employers of labor at that time, but training was only provided to local employees to enable them to fill unskilled or semiskilled jobs. The nature of the industries and these employment practices meant that the diffusion of organizing and technological skills to developing economies was far less than to developed economies. Technological diffusion worked best when there were already established firms which could be stimulated to become more competitive by foreign firms, or had the capacity to absorb workers who moved on from foreign firms. (Jones 2014) Nor were foreign companies typically transformers of domestic institutions. While theoretically they may have been channels to transfer aspects of the institutional arrangements in their home countries to their hosts, for the most part they reinforced local institutions. This was most directly seen in the concession system. In order to entice firms to make investments in mines, railroads, and so on, foreign firms were often given large concessions often involving freedom from taxation and other requirements over very long The nature of the first global economy, then, meant that there was limited diffusion of entrepreneurship and organizing capabilities from Western firms in the Rest. Their primary impact was often to lock-in countries as resource providers, and to reinforce institutional constraints on domestic entrepreneurship rather than removing them. This partly explains why the domestic entrepreneurial response to globalization was weaker than might have been imagined, which at its heart lay in a lagged understanding of the opportunities offered by the new global economy combined with problems building effective business organizations which could absorb foreign technological and organizational skills. Public policy was one way to break constraints on local entrepreneurs, but few governments in developing countries had either the autonomy or the capacity to pursue effective public policies.
Yet by 1914 the evidence, patchy as it might be, suggests that the lag was being addressed in India, China, and some countries in Latin America, especially Argentina, where five large business groups had built diversified businesses spanning both manufacturing, finance and resources. (Barbero 2015, 8-14) . During the interwar years there were significant examples of strong locally-owned business enterprises emerging in India, China, Egypt, Turkey and elsewhere. (Koll 2003 , Zelin, 2005 , Davis 1983 , Colpan and Jones, 2016 . However after World War 2, many governments opted for state-led industrialization programs which frequently disrupted local firms, whilst blocking or discouraging foreign firms. Protectionism and restrictions on foreign firms provided a context for new local firms to emerge, but these policies also provided incentives for firms to build skills in political contacts rather than technology. (Jones, 2013) By 1980 the gap in income levels between the rich nations and the Rest was bigger than in 1914. Japan was the only case of a spectacular catch up, with a number of other smaller East and south-east Asian economies following at a distance. Elsewhere, state interventionist regimes had encountered growing problems of macro-economic instability and hyper-inflation by the 1970s. (Jones, 2013) The Great Convergence
The fast economic growth seen in China and India, and certain other regions of the Rest also, from the 1980s provide limited support for North-style institutional arguments.
China's resurgence began under Deng Xiaoping, who had little concern with controls over the executive, human rights, political rights or intellectual property protection. There is more support for Baumol's argument that shifts in the rules of the game more broadly can stimulate productive entrepreneurship. Policy liberalization and deregulation important in allowing capitalist enterprise to flourish, even in Communist China.
Interestingly, many of the businesses which flourished with liberalization over the last thirty years had been founded and grew in the earlier era of import substitution. This policy regime provided local firms with opportunities to achieve scale within their protected domestic markets. A pioneer of this strategy was post-1945, which excluded most inward FDI, enabling automobile firms like Toyota and Nissan, and their electronics equivalents, to scale at home before seeking foreign markets. Two decades later it was in the context of a protected local market, and a repressive military regime, that South Korean chaebol such as Samsung got started. Similarly Cemex, now one of the world's largest cement companies, was founded in Mexico in 1906, and was able to grow in a sheltered environment slowly becoming a regional player and then, in the 1970s, a national player.
As the Mexican and other economies liberalized, it was well-positioned to expand globally. In 1992, CEMEX began globalization by purchasing Spain's two largest cement companies.
In India, the era of the so-called "License Raj" between the 1950s and 1980s also enabled firms to grow within their domestic market. Arguably, it laid the basis for the country's subsequently successful IT services sector. Postwar India had growing numbers of engineers owing to the many national institutes, engineering universities and regional colleges established after 1947. However, it had little choice to be totally dependent on US computer makers. During the 1960s and 1970s a handful of locally-owned firms were established to develop and run applications software for Indian companies and research institutions that had brought or leased mainframes from IBM and other US companies.
Tata, which had remained India's largest business group, established the first of these firms, Tata Consulting Services in 1968. This and other ventures remained small, however, until 1977, when, after the Indian government tightened the laws on foreign ownership of firms, IBM and other US firms divested.
The departure of IBM opened new opportunities for local firms. TCS developed a relationship with another US computer maker, Burroughs, which provided an important channel of new technology. In 1982 the start-up Infosys was founded by the dynamic entrepreneur Narayana Murthy. The Indian firms built a strong trade association, NASSCOM, which sought to enhance and certify the quality of Indian firms. By the time policy regulation got underway in 1991, which gave Indian IT firms a freer hand in establishing marketing offices abroad and serving foreign clients, it had built strong organizational capabilities. The software industry became focused on Bangalore, where the British had established India's first aircraft factory during World War 2, and which was the home of two of India's premier institutes of higher education in pure science. Like Silicon Valley, there was also a pleasant climate, at least before pollution began to increase. The 
Conclusion
This working paper has sought to integrate a business history perspective into debates about the Great Divergence and its consequences, and the more recent Great
Convergence. While recognizing that the context of institutions, education and culture play a role in explanations of wealth and poverty, the working paper calls for a closer engagement with the processes how these factors translate into generating productive firms and entrepreneurs.
In explaining why the development of modern business enterprise in the Rest lagged, the recasting of existing literature into the framework of the Great Divergence debate permits important insights. The societal and cultural embeddedness of new technologies provide one important explanatory factor. Evidently, the challenges were sufficiently great in the Rest that minorities held significant advantages in capital-raising and trust levels which enabled them to flourish as entrepreneurs. They were also benefitted from a greater willingness to engage Western firms and colonial governments. In contrast, multinationals proved disappointing diffusers of organizational skills and information to the Rest, and had limited importance in relieving the institutional, human capital or other constraints faced by local entrepreneurs. By the interwar years there is evidence of emergent modern entrepreneurship and business enterprise in Asia, Latin America and Africa. However many governmental policies after 1945 designed to facilitate catch-up ended up crippling such emergent business enterprises without putting an effective alternatives in place.
The second wave of globalization from the 1980s, which is now ending, provided more opportunities for catch up from the Rest. Firms from emerging markets had the opportunity to access the global networks which in part replaced large integrated firms.
There were also new ways for firms in the Rest to access knowledge and capital. Business historians have an enormous opportunity to contribute to understanding these processes.
